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Main Questions
• What is the relative importance of
? risk aversion
? loss aversion
? preferences for the timing of uncertainty resolution
? error-proneness
for behaviour in risky choice experiments?
• How important is heterogeneity in these parameters?
• How much of the heterogeneity can be attributed to observable variables?
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Outline
• Experimental setup and descriptives.
• A model of choice under risk.
• Econometric specification.
• Results.
• Summary & Conclusions.
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Experimental Setup
• Subject pool: CentERpanel and Laboratory.
• Standard Multiple Price List Design.
• Modify it somewhat to lower cognitive load.
Setup 3
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Screenshot of Lottery 5, First Screen
Progress:  70% Instructions Help









€ 21 with probability 25%
€ 18 with probability 75%
€ 54 with probability 25%
€ -9 with probability 75%
€ 21 with probability 50%
€ 18 with probability 50%
€ 54 with probability 50%
€ -9 with probability 50%
€ 21 with probability 75%
€ 18 with probability 25%
€ 54 with probability 75%
€ -9 with probability 25%
€ 21 with probability
100%
€ 18 with probability 0%
€ 54 with probability
100%
€ -9 with probability 0%
   
 Continue
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Payoffs from the Seven Lotteries
Payoff Uncertainty Payoff Payoff Uncertainty Payoff Payoff
Configuration Resolution, A Low, A High, A Resolution, B Low, B High, B
1 early 27 33 early 0 69
2 early 39 48 early 9 87
3 early 12 15 early -15 48
4 early 33 36 late 6 69
5 early 18 21 late -9 54
6 early 24 27 early -3 60
7 late 15 18 late -12 51
Note: These values were shown in the high incentive and hypothetical treatments. For the
low incentive treatment they were divided by three. The order was randomised.
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Structure of the Data
• We have N = 1422 (CentERpanel) and N = 178 (Lab).
• Unbalanced panel of binary decisions with J ∈ {28, 32, . . . , 56}
• Core regressors: Constant, incentive treatments, covariance matrix of
unobserved effects.
• (Demographic) controls: sex, age, education, household income, wealth,
financial experience/knowledge, short / long completion time.
Data 6
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Outline
• Experimental setup and descriptives.
• A model of choice under risk.
• Econometric specification.
• Results.
• Summary & Conclusions.
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Expected Utility of Income
• Start from a simple exponential utility model with loss aversion:









−γz for z < 0
(1)
where z ∈ R denote lottery outcomes, γ ∈ R is the coefficient of absolute
risk aversion, λ ∈ R+ is the loss aversion parameter
• Why not power utility? Problems around the origin, difficult to incorpo-
rate uncertainty resolution preferences with positive and negative payoffs.
But some robustness checks in the paper (worse fit).
Model 13
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Uncertainty Resolution Preferences
• Kreps & Porteus (1978): Two periods, first one only serves to resolve
uncertainty or not. The first period utility evaluation V (·) of a gamble
π is given by:
V (π) =
 E[h(v(z, ·))] for early resolutionh(E[v(z, ·)]) for late resolution (2)
• h(·) convex (concave,linear) ⇔ Early Resolution  Late Res. (≺,∼).
• For estimation reasons, want a one-parameter version of h(·).
Model 14
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• We use: h(v(z, ·)) = −S(−S v(z, ·))ρ
−S
(3)
with ρ ∈ R+ and S the following sign operator:
S =
{
1 for γ ≥ 0
−1 for γ < 0.
• For ρ > 1, early resolution is preferred to late resolution, indifference is
obtained for ρ = 1, and late resolution is preferred for ρ < 1.
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• We use: h(v(z, ·)) = −S(−S v(z, ·))ρ
−S
(3)
with ρ ∈ R+ and S the following sign operator:
S =
{
1 for γ ≥ 0
−1 for γ < 0.
• For ρ > 1, early resolution is preferred to late resolution, indifference is
obtained for ρ = 1, and late resolution is preferred for ρ < 1.
• The second period utility function is a slightly modified version of
equation (1):
v(z, γ, λ, ρ) =
 max{−
λ
γ , 0} −
1
γe






−γρSz for z < 0
(4)
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Econometric Specification: Random Coefficients Model
• Binary choice between lotteries πA and πB. Take the difference in
certainty equivalents between the lotteries for choice j by individual i:
∆CEij = CE(πBij , γi, λi, ρi)− CE(πAij, γi, λi, ρi)
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Econometric Specification: Random Coefficients Model
• Binary choice between lotteries πA and πB. Take the difference in
certainty equivalents between the lotteries for choice j by individual i:
∆CEij = CE(πBij , γi, λi, ρi)− CE(πAij, γi, λi, ρi)
• The actual choice is then: Yij = I {∆CEij + τεij > 0}; εij ∼ Λ
• Likelihood of each observation:















• Two sources of error: Monetary cost of “wrong” choice τ , probability for
random behaviour ωi.
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• Write: ηi = gη(Xηi β
η + ξηi ), ηi = {γi, λi, ρi, ωi} (5)
where the gη(·) serve to impose the theoretical parameter restrictions.
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Outline
• Experimental setup and descriptives.
• A model of choice under risk.
• Econometric specification.
• Results.
• Summary & Conclusions.
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Observable Correlates: Results in a Nutshell
• Median utility function concave (γ ≈ .032), has a kink at zero (λ ≈ 2.4),
no KP effects (ρ ≈ 1), random choice propensity high (ω ≈ 8.3%).
• Few important differences between high incentive and hypothetical treat-
ment, utility curvature more pronounced in the low incentive treatment.
• Women: more risk averse and loss averse, more inconsistencies.
• Positive age gradient of risk aversion and error frequency. Loss aversion
peaks at ages 35-44 and decreases thereafter.
• Higher educated persons: less risk averse, substantially fewer mistakes.
• Little effects of income and wealth – but errors decrease in wealth.
• No significant associations for uncertainty resolution preferences.
Estimates: Observable Correlates, CentERpanel 19
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D: Risk Premium of (25,−15,.5,Late Res.)
gam lam rho
Parameter Distributions, CentERpanel vs. Lab 21
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Summary & Conclusions
• Individual heterogeneity in risk aversion and loss aversion plays a sub-
stantial role in decision-making under risk. This is less the case for
uncertainty resolution preferences.
• In terms of design, experiments aimed at “eliciting” parameters should
aim to generate overidentifying information and seek to allow subjects to
make mistakes.
• This is all the more important in a non-student population.
• Idiosyncratic heterogeneity in preferences and errors appears to be much
more important than associations with observable characteristics.
Summary & Conclusions 34
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Appendix: Alternative Utility Specifications
• Simple CARA
u(z, γ) = −1
γ
e−γz
• CARA including loss aversion









−γz for z < 0
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• CARA, Prospect-Theory Type















γz for z < 0 ∧ γ > 0
• CRRA, Prospect-Theory Type
u(z, γ, λ) =

z1−γ for z ≥ 0
−λ · (−z)1+γ for z < 0 ∧ γ < 0
−λ · (−z)1−γ for z < 0 ∧ γ > 0
Alternative Utility Specifications 36
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B: Risk Premium of (25,−15,.5), med
CA LA PT PTCRRA
Risk Premia for Implied Conditional Average Parameters, CentERpanel 37























C: Risk Premium of (25,65,.5), q10























D: Risk Premium of (25,−15,.5), q10























E: Risk Premium of (25,65,.5), q90























F: Risk Premium of (25,−15,.5), q90
CA LA PT PTCRRA
Risk Premia by Parameter Quantiles for Alternative Models, CentERpanel 38
